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1 Introductory considerations
The recent book by T. Picketty [Picketty 2014] started a worldwide debate
on wealth inequality and, among other positive effects, it may shift the fo-
cus of economic theory towards the study of distributional properties. In or-
der to understand inequality, the Lorenz curve is one of the most used tools
[Lorenz 1905]. This curve represents the cumulative fraction of total wealth
versus the cumulative fraction of wealth-receiving units. To be more specific,
assume we are given a positive (or non-negative) random variable U represent-
ing the wealth of an economic agent and m sampled values {ul}ml=1 that we take
ordered so that ul ≤ ul+1. Then the Lorenz curve is the piecewise continuous
curve linearly interpolating the points {(F̂l, L̂l)}ml=0, where (F̂0, L̂0) = (0, 0),





is the cumulative wealth and
L̂l = Ŝl/Ŝm (2)
is the corresponding cumulative fraction of total wealth. These equations can
be used to determine the empirical Lorenz curve from a dataset of wealths.
Let us further assume that the wealth is a multiple of some unit of wealth and
that we guess the distribution function p(j, φ) = P(U = j|φ), where j ∈ N is
the integer numerical value of wealth and φ is a vector of unknown parameters.
The empirical Lorenz curve, can be compared with the Lorenz curve of the
distribution p(j, φ) that is given by the curve connecting the points (Fk, Lk),
k = 0, . . . , n+ 1, where n is the integer for which Fn+1 = 1 (which is also the
total wealth) and










j=1 jp(j, φ), and
Lk+1 = Sk+1/Sn+1, (5)
and with (F0, L0) = (0, 0). Then, one can use his/her favorite statistical method
to determine the vector of parameters φ which better fits the empirical distri-
bution by minimizing the distance between the empirical points {(F̂l, L̂l)}ml=0
and the model points {(Fk, Lk)}n+1k=0 .
A large part of the literature on fitting the Lorenz curve focuses on look-
ing for suitable phenomenological equations that can be used to represent the
empirical data in the better available way. Here we quote a selection of the
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papers devoted to this problem, the interested reader can use these refer-
ences as an entry point to the literature. [Kakwani and Podder 1976] suggest
a new parameterization of the curve and use four different methods to es-
timate the Lorenz curve from grouped data. [Sarabia et al. 1999] introduce a
general method to create parametric families of Lorenz curves. Hybrid additive
and multiplicative models are proposed by [Ogwang and Gouranga Rao 2000].
[Rhode 2009] presents a one-parameter family of curves and [Helene 2010] uses
another family of curves, linear in the parameters.
We depart from this tradition by proposing a fit of the Lorenz curve based
on a wealth probability distribution justified according to the finitary prob-
abilistic approach introduced in a recent book ([Garibaldi and Scalas 2010]).
We consider the wealth composed of n tokens or coins to be distributed to g
agents. We introduce three basic stochastic games which could be at work in
an economy and, for two of them, we derive their invariant distributions which
are also equilibrium distributions. A heuristic argument leads us to conjecture
that the expected observed wealth distribution is a mixture of these two distri-
butions and of the distribution of a third, degenerate process, and we compare
the Lorenz curves obtained from this conjecture with those from an available
database of empirical data (for the database see [Davies et al. 2009]).
2 Finitary models for the wealth distribution
In a recent note [Garibaldi et al. 2013], we proposed a model of the distri-
bution of wealth based on the interplay of three stochastic games. Our ap-
proach is inspired by Masanao Aoki’s methods (see [Aoki 1996], [Aoki 2004]
and [Aoki and Yoshikawa 2011]) and was discussed at length in a book pub-
lished in 2010 [Garibaldi and Scalas 2010]. These games schematically repre-
sent realistic mechanisms acting in the economy, they are:
1. The Bennati-Drăgulescu-Yakovenko (BDY) game [Scalas et al. 2006];
2. the taxation-and-redistribution (TAR) game [Garibaldi et al. 2007];
3. the Zipf-Simon-Yule (ZSY) game [Garibaldi et al. 2006].
The BDY game gives the background noise of the economy. It is a decentralized
mechanism in which two agents interact and one of them “steals” part of the
wealth of the other. In the TAR game, wealth is removed according to a
probability distribution proportional to the wealth of agents and redistributed
according to a Pólya transition probability. Finally, the ZSY game includes
failures and redistribution of wealth in favor of the Rich.
Let us now define each game. Before that, we recall some basic definitions.
In our finitary approach, wealth is represented by “coins” representing wealth
tokens that can be exchanged between and among agents. We consider g agents
with a total wealth of n coins. The occupation vector n = (n1, . . . , ng) rep-
resents a state of the system where the i-th agent has ni coins. Given such a
state, we can count the number of agents with 0 coins, 1 coin, 2 coins, etc.,
and we define the wealth distribution using the vector z = (z0, . . . , zn), where
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ni = n, (6)
n∑
j=0




jzj = n. (8)
The BDY game runs as follows. At the beginning of the game, each agent
is endowed e.g. with the same number of coins n/g; any other initial state will
lead to the same equilibrium distribution. Then a loser is drawn uniformly
among all the agents with at least one coin and a winner is drawn uniformly
among all agents (the winner and the loser may coincide). The loser gives
a coin to the winner and the game is repeated again and again. This game
simulates an unfair transaction between two agents, where the winner steals
part of the wealth of the loser. Those who believe in (neo)classical marginal-
ism will say that such a transaction is not possible or it is out of economic
equilibrium. However, given the presence of asymmetric information in eco-
nomic transactions, the BDY mechanism is not necessarily uncommon. In
the BDY game, indebtedness is impossible: an agent without coins cannot be
selected as the loser. If n = (n1, . . . , ng) denotes the agent description be-
fore the game step, the occupation vector after the step can be written as
nji = (n1, . . . , ni − 1, . . . , nj + 1, . . . , ng) (notice that this is a particular case,
where i < j, but one can also have i ≥ j). The corresponding transition
probability is






where z0(n) is the number of agents with zero coins before the game step and
δni,0 is used, somewhat redundantly, to denote the fact that the loser cannot
be selected among the agents with zero coins. The homogeneous Markov chain
defined by (9) and by the initial state described above is reversible and the
invariant measure can be found by means of detailed balance. It turns out that,
the probability of any of the possible states π(n) = P(Y = n) is proportional
to the number of agents with at least one coin
π(n) = C(g − z0(n)). (10)
The Markov chain defined by (9) is irreducible and aperiodic, therefore, equa-
tion (10) also gives the equilibrium probability distribution. In the limit n
g  1, the marginal expected wealth distribution corresponding to (10) is
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approximately described by a geometric distribution of parameter g/n, as dis-










given that one has
E(Zi) = gP(Y1 = i) (12)
for equidistributed agents.
In the TAR game, a coin is removed from an agent with probability propor-
tional to its wealth and it is given to another agent with probability depending
on its wealth and on a redistribution weight αi. To be more specific, at each
step of the game, again one has a transition from n to nji , but this time the
transition probability is
P(Y(t+ 1) = nji |Y(t) = n) =
ni
n
αj + nj − δi,j
θ + n− 1
, (13)
where (α1, . . . , αn) are the weights for redistribution, and θ =
∑g
i=1 αi. Again,
the Markov chain with this transition probability is reversible and we can
derive the invariant probability distribution using detailed balance and leading











where x[n] denotes the Pochhammer symbol for the rising factorial x[n] =
x(x+ 1) · · · (x+ n− 1). If we put all the agents on a par, defining α = θ/g as
the common weight, we can have two situations. If α > 0, then richer agents
are favored in the redistribution, whereas for α→∞ and θ →∞ in a way such
that g = θ/α remains constant, then all the agents have the same probability
of receiving the coin. Finally, one can also consider the case α < 0 in which
poorer agents receive the coin with higher probability. In this case, the rising
factorial has to be replaced by the falling factorial x[n] = x(x−1) · · · (x−n+1).
If we now apply equation (12) to (14), further assuming that all the weights are









In the limit n  g  1, and with θ  1, equation (15) can be approximated














The ZSY game is introduced as a mechanism to generate heavy tails. As
we consider a conservative model of the economy, with g and n constant in
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time, we modify the original algorithm proposed in [Garibaldi et al. 2006] as
follows. An agent with at least one coin is selected at random and all his coins
are removed. This step can be considered as a failure. Then the coins of the
failed agent are redistributed to the other agents with probability proportional
to their wealth. With this mechanism, agents without coins cannot receive
further coins. This is the limit of the Simon-Yule process where the probability
of innovation u vanishes. For u = 0, one has a degenerate process leading to a
state where a single agent owns all the coins after g − 1 steps. However, this
degenerate process can be used without problems in a conservative system,
if only one step is run preceded and followed by many BDY steps, as in the
simulation which will be described in the next session. The ZSY redistribution
procedure favors the richer agents who get a higher fraction of the coins, but
all the agents with at least one coin are on a par with respect to the failure
mechanism. In Monte Carlo analyses of this process (see [Garibaldi et al. 2006,
Garibaldi and Scalas 2010,Garibaldi et al. 2013]), we found that the expected
wealth generated by this process can be approximated by a Yule distribution,
in other words we have
E(Zj)
g
' ρB(j, ρ+ 1), (17)
where B(x, y) is the Beta function and ρ > 0. Contrary to equations (11) and
(16), this result is not exact and the approximation is not controlled. What
we can say is that the Ansatz given by (17) seems to work.
3 Data analysis
3.1 A conjecture
In [Garibaldi et al. 2013], we simulated the three games in order to repro-
duce what happens in a real economy, using so-called supermoves. On each
basic period (a day), one BDY step is run. At the end of each month, cor-
responding to l days, we have a ZSY failure and, finally, at the end of each
year, corresponding to k months a TAR move is run with the mechanism of
block taxation (namely with the removal of m > 1 coins before redistribution,
see [Garibaldi et al. 2007] and [Garibaldi and Scalas 2010]). This simulation is
the realization of non-homogeneous Markov chain (however notice that, if the
process is only sampled after each super move, the resulting chain is homoge-
neous). Depending on when we decide to observe the outcome of the simula-
tion, we can observe different distributions. The three moves can be weighted
so that they move the same average number of coins. This model will be the
subject of a detailed study in a future forthcoming paper. However, we can see
that the simulation has three exact limits. If the block taxation moves the total
number of coins n, statistical equilibrium is immediately reached after the TAR
move and the distribution is given by equation (16); this result is proven in
[Garibaldi et al. 2007] as well as in section 8.2 of [Garibaldi and Scalas 2010].
If the number of days in a month is very large (the number of BDY steps is
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very large), the equilibrium distribution after each month is given by equation
(11). If the number of months is very large with a month having n/g BDY
steps as well as a final ZSY failure, the limiting distribution at the end of the
year and before taxation is given by the limiting distribution of the combi-
nation of a ZSY step followed by n/g BDY which is approximately given by
equation (17) with ρ ' 1 + g/n & 1.
Hence, we simply conjecture that the empirically observed expected wealth
distribution can be described by a mixture of the three distributions intro-
duced in the previous subsection and given by equations (11), (16), and (17).























where φ is the vector of unknown parameters and p1 + p2 + p3 = 1.
3.2 The data set
The data set that we use to fit the Lorenz curve according to equation (18) is
taken from [Davies et al. 2009]. In that paper, wealth is defined as the sum of
real assets and financial assets minus debt. The data set covers the wealth of
family units in Canada for 1999 (8 points), in Switzerland for 1997 (6 points),
and in the United States for 2001 (12 points), personal wealth in China for 2002
(10 points), and in France for 1994 (4 points), household wealth in Germany
for 1998 (10 points), in India for 2002–2003 (12 points), in Italy for 2000 (6
points), in Japan for 1999 (10 points), and in Spain for 2002 (8 points). The
respective Lorenz curves are represented in Figure 1 where the empirical data
are plotted as colored stars or circles as described by the legend where Gini
indices are also given.
3.3 The fitting procedure
In order to fit the points (Fk, Lk) of the conjectured Lorenz curve based on
equation (18) to the real data (F̂l, L̂l) we use an ordinary least square proce-




(L(φ)kl − L̂l)2, (19)
to be minimized with respect to φ, the vector of parameters of the distribution,
namely φ = (p1, p2, p3, λ, α, ρ) with λ = g/n and α = θ/g (remember also that
χ = 1/(λα)). The constraints on the weights are p1+p2+p3 = 1 and 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1
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Canada (G = 0.664)
China (G = 0.536)
France (G = 0.526)
Germany (G = 0.654)
India (G = 0.663)
Italy (G = 0.577)
Japan (G = 0.533)
Spain (G = 0.554)
Switzerland (G = 0.648)
USA (G = 0.799)
perfect equality
Fig. 1: (Color on-line) Wealth shares by country from the empirical data (col-
ored stars and circles) and Lorenz curves obtained from the model (colored
dotted lines and solid lines). Empirical Gini indices are calculated as twice
the area between the empirical Lorenz curve (not displayed) and the line of
perfect equality.
for i = 1, 2, 3. The constraints on the parameters of the distributions are λ > 0,
α > 0 and ρ > 0. In equation (19), kl is given by
kl = arg mink|Fk − F̂l|, (20)
and L(φ)kl represent the ordinate of the theoretical Lorenz curve. The results
of the minimization procedure are given in Table 1. The lines in Figure 1
represent the model Lorenz curves with the parameters given by the fit. An
eye inspection of this figure gives a first hint on the goodness of this fit. This
is further investigated in Figure 2. In Figures 2 (a) and 2 (b), we plot the cases
in which the square distance given by equation (19) is minimal and maximal,
respectively. However, one can observe that the model estimate of the Gini
index is worse for Switzerland than for Spain. This is due to the fact that the
data of the empirical Lorenz curve for Switzerland do not include the points
below 90% of the population. This fact is further illustrated in Figures 2 (c)
and 2 (d), where the cases with the best and worst model estimate of the Gini
index are plotted. Again, in the case of France, the lower part of the empirical
Lorenz curve is not there. From Table 1, analyzing d2, we can say that the
fit between the empirical curve and the model curve is satisfactory in all the
investigated cases with d2 in the range 10−5 − 10−2. On the contrary, the
model estimate of the Gini index is significantly different from the empirical
estimate for France and Switzerland for the reason discussed above.
Given that we do not have full information on the distribution of wealth,
with the previous procedure, we are looking for 5 parameters in order to fit a
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Country p1 p2 λ α ρ d2 Gdata Gmodel
Canada 0.54 0.28 0.070 0.256 0.841 1.650 · 10−4 0.664 0.690
China 0.45 0.48 0.018 1.658 0.327 5.603 · 10−4 0.536 0.563
France 0.008 0.57 0.049 0.465 0.938 1.120 · 10−4 0.526 0.755
Germany 0.35 0.30 0.022 0.875 1.934 2.594 · 10−4 0.654 0.663
India 0.40 0.22 0.106 0.292 1.236 8.901 · 10−4 0.663 0.678
Italy 0.44 0.20 0.225 0.446 1.334 3.539 · 10−4 0.577 0.639
Japan 0.66 0.30 0.016 1.211 0.322 1.264 · 10−4 0.533 0.554
Spain 0.06 0.55 0.071 2.748 1.050 20.30 · 10−4 0.554 0.575
Switzerland 0.40 0.38 0.154 0.070 0.943 3.132 · 10−5 0.648 0.819
USA 0.16 0.51 0.003 0.768 0.669 6.200 · 10−3 0.799 0.813
Table 1: Values of the model parameters (p1, p2, λ, α and ρ) obtained in
the OLS fitting procedure, together with the square distance d2 between the
empirical data and the model from equation (19), and Gini indicesG calculated
both from the data and from the model as twice the area between the respective
Lorenz curves and the line of perfect equality. Note that p3 = 1− p1 − p2.
Lorenz curve with a small number of points. In the case of France, the number
of points is just 4 and it is even smaller than the number of parameters. There
is a risk of over fitting. In order to investigate this issue, we can repeat the
minimisation procedure setting the parameter ρ of the Yule distribution at its
theoretical value ρ = 1+λ. The results of this new fit are presented in Table 2.
Now, this second model is a restriction of the previous one. Then one can use
the F statistic defined as F = (m− 5)(d24 − d25)/d25 in order to assess if the fit
with 5 parameters is significantly better than the fit with 4 parameters, where
d25 is the square distance with 5 parameters, d
2
4 is the square distance with 4
parameters and m is the number of data points [Box 1953]. This statistic has
the Fisher-Snedecor F -distribution of parameters (1,m− 5). Table 3 contains
the value of the statistic obtained from the data and the critical values at three
significance levels. The null hypothesis that the model with 5 parameters does
not provide a significantly better fit than model with 4 parameters is rejected
if the statistic is larger than the critical value. For most of the countries, it
turns out that the 5-parameter model is not significantly better than the 4-
parameter model. Before concluding this section, we would like to stress that,
in principle, this model has only three free parameters. In fact if the size of
the total wealth n as well as the number of households or individuals g are
known, λ must be fixed at the value g/n. Therefore, the only free parameters
are p1, p2 and α. Unfortunately, in this study, we do not have these pieces of
information.
4 Discussion
In the previous section, we have shown that the Ansatz given by equation (18)
is able to satisfactorily reproduce the empirical Lorenz curve for the available
dataset. Unfortunately, the empirical wealth distribution is not available in
the data set. Fitting this distribution is a more demanding test for a model.
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Country p1 p2 λ α d2 Gdata Gmodel
Canada 0.28 0.14 0.002 0.598 5.0 · 10−3 0.664 0.708
China 0.23 0.18 0.003 1.360 5.7 · 10−3 0.536 0.538
France 0.22 0.23 0.006 0.632 2.0 · 10−3 0.526 0.841
Germany 0.52 0.32 0.004 0.728 2.5 · 10−3 0.654 0.695
India 0.32 0.21 0.0005 0.519 2.2 · 10−2 0.663 0.704
Italy 0.10 0.45 0.006 0.860 6.1 · 10−3 0.577 0.737
Japan 0.41 0.29 0.002 0.983 2.6 · 10−3 0.533 0.556
Spain 0.13 0.10 0.004 1.105 4.8 · 10−3 0.554 0.611
Switzerland 0.31 0.28 0.010 0.568 3.2 · 10−2 0.648 0.905
USA 0.09 0.008 0.008 1.177 2.0 · 10−2 0.799 0.774
Table 2: Values of the model parameters (p1, p2, λ and α) obtained in the OLS
fitting procedure, together with the square distance d2 between the empirical
data and the model from equation (19), and Gini indices G calculated both
from the data and from the model as twice the area between the respective
Lorenz curves and the line of perfect equality. Note that p3 = 1− p1 − p2.
Country Fdata Fc (5%) Fc (1%) Fc (10%)
Canada 9.8 10.1 34.1 5.5
China 1.8 6.6 16.3 4.1
Germany 1.7 6.6 16.3 4.1
India 3.4 5.6 12.2 3.6
Italy 16.2 161.4 4052.2 39.9
Japan 3.9 6.6 16.3 4.1
Spain 0.5 10.1 34.2 5.5
Switzerland 1041 161.4 4052.1 39.9
USA 0.3 5.6 12.2 3.6





, are compared with critical value
of F -distribution with (1,m − 5) degrees of freedom for significance levels of
5%, 1% and 10%. For France, it is not possible to calculate the critical values.
The null hypothesis (that the model with 5 parameters does not provide a
significantly better fit than model with 4 parameters) is rejected in the cases
reported in italics.
In the insets of Figure 2, we present double logarithmic plots of the wealth
distributions obtained from the fits according to our Ansatz. They have the
desirable property that their tails follow a power law.
An important feature of the wealth distribution is the presence of indebted-
ness and negative wealth. Indeed, given that in [Davies et al. 2009], the wealth
of an agent is defined as real assets plus financial assets minus debt, one can
have individuals, families or households with negative wealth. In order to take
properly into account such cases, one must use more elaborate agent-based
models, where every agent is characterized by a balance sheet and the time-
evolution is stock-flow consistent as in [Raberto et al. 2012].
Our future work on this subject will focus on a detailed study of the sim-
ulation described in Section 3 and initially studied in [Garibaldi et al. 2013].
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Fig. 2: Lorenz curve fitting: the empirical data are represented by stars, the
solid lines are the model fits and the insets contain the corresponding wealth
probability distributions from the model. The best fit in terms of distance d is
obtained for Switzerland (a) and the worst for Spain (b). In the terms of Gini
index (G) the best fit is obtained for Germany (c) and the worst for France
(d).
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